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1 Introduction 
In the last two decades, central banks of advanced countries have introduced inflation targeting 
(IT) as an anchor for monetary policy, with relatively good results in most cases. Such countries 
include New Zealand, Czech Republic, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Sweden.  As explained 
by Guy et al. (1998), many of these economies have focused on targeting the inflation rate instead 
of the traditionally used intermediate targets (money supply, interest rate and exchange rate). The 
former approach which focuses on the inflation rate itself is IT.  
 
The argument put forward by IT central banks is that; (i) the former use of money supply as the 
main objective for monetary policy (based on the assumption that there is some stable relationship 
between changes in the money supply and inflation rate) is no longer reliable (Stals, 1999); (ii) 
practical experience has demonstrated that short-term manipulation of the money supply to achieve 
other goals (higher employment or perhaps enhance output among others) may conflict with price 
stability; and (iii) central banks often appear to get more public criticism for rising inflation rate 
than lower ones, although they are at the same time subject to constant pressure to reduce 
unemployment and/or increase output. The IT policy helps to address these concerns by making 
inflation rather than employment, output, or some other criteria the primary objective of monetary 
policy (Guy et al., 1998).  
 
Under the IT policy, monetary authorities explain their decision to achieve price stability given 
that low and steady inflation rate contributes more to economic growth. The conduct of the IT 
policy is straight forward in theory. The central bank forecasts the future path of inflation; the 
forecast is compared with the target inflation rate1; the difference between the forecast and the 
                                                          
1 The inflation rate the government believes is appropriate for the economy 
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target determines how monetary policy has to be adjusted. IT central banks believe this policy has 
the ability to improve the performance of monetary policy in the medium to long term compared 
to the conventional procedures followed by non-inflation targeting central banks. What is crucial 
is that most of the IT policy countries have recorded significant falls in their levels of inflation 
although performances in developed countries dominate those in developing countries (see 
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2012).  
 
Ghana formally adopted an IT framework as its monetary policy in May, 2007. Following this, the 
central bank announced price stability as its primary objective. However implicit (without formal 
announcement) IT actually started in January 2002. The Bank of Ghana (BoG) Act 2002 (Act 612) 
gave operational independence to the central bank, and established an implicit IT framework and 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) for the implementation of the new policy2. It is interesting to 
note that, the adoption of the IT policy saw domestic debt to GDP decrease from about 31% in 
2001 to 13.5% in 2006 and inflation also decreasing from about 41.9% in 2001 to around 12.7% 
in 2006 (Maureen, 2008). Ghana's five-year success with implicit IT policy encouraged the country 
to formally adopt the policy in 2007 which made it the second country (after South Africa) in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 
Figure 1 shows the plot of the prime rate, the 91-day Treasury bill rate, the 182-day Treasury bill 
rate, the deposit rate, and the lending rate. As evident, all the series generally trend downwards 
during the period of IT policy. The trends of the financial market interest rates show high spread 
between the commercial banks deposit and lending rates as the deposit rates are relatively low 
compared to the lending rates. The high spread points to a likely disincentive to savings and high 
                                                          
2 The goal and decisions of the MPC are communicated on regular basis to the general public. 
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cost of borrowing to private investors. The Treasury bill rate however stayed higher compared to 
deposit rate of the commercial banks over the period, an indication of potential crowding out of 
private investment.  
FIGURE 1 
 
Despite the considerable fall in the prime rate3, commercial banks lend at high interest rates to 
private investors. This questions the effectiveness of the prime rate in influencing lending rates in 
the Ghanaian economy. The interest rate on deposit accounts falls almost directly with the prime 
rate but lending rates turns to be sticky downwards. Commercial banks have always attributed 
these anomalies to default risk associated with loans. For the IT policy to promote saving, 
investment and economic growth, it should be effective on movement in financial market interest 
rates and credit creation in the economy. This is crucial because, although the implementation of 
IT policy in Ghana has seen gradual fall of the previously high inflation rate (see Kyereboah-
Coleman, 2012), not all interest rates have responded adequately. Moreover, many empirical 
studies on this subject have focused on advanced countries with results rarely found in developing 
countries due to few countries adopting the policy.  
Notwithstanding, it is important to note that although a number of studies on Ghana has been 
conducted on this same topic (see, for example, Abradu-Otoo et al., 2003; Acheampong, 2005; Ghartey, 
2005; Amidu, 2006; CEPA, 2012; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2012; Fukac and Baldinin, 2014; Akosah, 2015), 
the present study make significant contribution. Aside the fact that we test the speed of adjustment of money 
market interest rates to the prime rate, similar to majority of the aforementioned studies, we go further to 
test asymmetric adjustment in the transmission of the prime rate to the respective interest rates. More so, 
                                                          
3 The prime rate is the BoG monetary policy rate or indicator. 
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the approach to examining asymmetry adjustment in the present paper differ substantially from 
those considered in the abovementioned papers on Ghana. This gives the present paper a different 
focus from other studies on Ghana. In addition, existing studies provided divergent results on the 
transmission of the prime rate to money market interest rates in Ghana.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The next section provides a brief overview of 
Ghana’s financial system and banking structure. This is followed by a review of related literature 
in Section 3, and a discussion of the model, data and the estimation strategy in Section 4. The 
results are then reported and discussed in Section 5, after which the paper offers the implications 
of the results, and concluding remarks in the last Section. 
 
2 Ghana’s financial system and banking structure: A brief overview 
The structure of Ghana’s financial system has undergone transformation since the 1980s. The 
government initiated a financial liberalization policy under the Financial Sector Adjustment 
Program (FINSAP) in 1988, supported by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
under the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1983. The main aim was to restructure the 
financial system and clean up nonperforming assets in order to make them viable and profitable 
(Aryeetey and Senbet, 2004). It was also meant to introduce technology, best practices in the 
business environment, and risk management system, aimed at creating healthy competition. Some 
of the reforms initiated under FINSAP, included fiscal and monetary operations, as well as 
privatization. The removal of the restrictions on foreign and domestic market entries, and the 
privatization of state-owned banks increased the number of commercial banks. Also, the 
liberalization in the banking industry led to the removal of interest rate controls and credit ceiling 
to allow banks compete for customers. The Exchange Control Act 1961 (Act 71) was replaced by 
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the Foreign Exchange Act 2006 (Act 723) to eliminate the restrictions associated in the 1961 Act 
to a more liberalized foreign exchange regime (Quartey and Afful-Mensah, 2014). 
 
Between 1990 and 2000 the number of banks in the country remained at 17, out of this 9 were 
commercial banks, 5 merchant banks, and 3 development banks. At the end of 2010, the number 
of Banks had risen to 26. Out of these banks, ownership was evenly distributed - 13 of them were 
Ghanaian owned banks and the remaining 13 foreign owned. As at September, 2016, there were 
32 banks in Ghana with ownership structure as described earlier (BoG, 2016a). Rural and 
community banks which accounted for almost 5 percent of the banking system’s total assets have 
also seen a significant improvement and by 2012 the number had risen to 133 reaching 137 in 2013 
and 140 in 2016 (BoG, 2016b). There has also been a remarkable increase in registered non-bank 
financial institutions; from 57 in 2014 (PWC, 2014; Quartey and Afful-Mensah, 2014) to 66 in 
June, 2016 (BoG, 2016c).  
 
It is important to note that the increase in the number of banks has reduced bank concentration as 
the market share of the dominant banks are gradually been distributed among new and emerging 
banks. For instance, Ghana Commercial Bank, Standard Chartered, Barclays Bank, and Social 
Security Bank together held 78.95% share of total assets of the banking sector in 1990. However, 
their dominance has declined continually reaching 66.84% in 1997, and 51.2% in 2005 (Owusu-
Antwi and Antwi, 2013). However, the entrance of new banks did not make much impact on the 
dominance of the four commercial banks until the Ecobank Bank Ghana Ltd acquired The Trust 
Bank leading to a further decline in the market share of the top four banks to 38.6% (Ziorklui, 
2001 and PWC, 2014). Restructuring of the banking system in Ghana has indeed improved 
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competition, therefore reducing dominance (Owusu-Antwi and Antwi, 2013). These developments 
are particularly important for the success of interest rate transmission in Ghana. 
 
3 Literature review 
3.1 Theoretical background 
There exists a large and expanding literature on rules for the specification of the prime rate and 
how monetary policy-makers have reacted to deviations of actual inflation from their – explicit or 
implicit - target rates or levels. This notwithstanding, the best known of these rules is the Taylor 
rule for interest rate determination (Taylor, 1993), which represents the behaviour and preferences 
of the monetary authorities. It stipulates how much the central bank should change the prime rate 
in response to changes in inflation, output, or other macroeconomic conditions in the economy. In 
particular, the rule stipulates that for each one per cent increase in inflation, the central bank should 
raise the prime rate by more than one percent. This approach to monetary policy analysis by central 
banks begin in theory with the specification of the central bank’s objective function and then derive 
the optimal rule for setting the prime rate in response to economic shocks. The prime rate deviates 
from the level consistent with the economy’s equilibrium real rate and the target inflation if the 
output gap is nonzero or if inflation deviates from its target. A positive output gap leads to a rise 
in the prime rate as does a deviation of actual inflation above the target rate. The Taylor rule 
therefore gives a general rule for the determination of the prime rate by central banks with enough 
evidence from advanced countries.  
 
3.2 Empirical literature 
Some studies have focused on interest rates and its response to monetary policy decision in Ghana. 
In a related study, Ghartey (2005) finds a significant relationship between Treasury bill rate and 
the monetary policy rate (transmission mechanism from policy rate to Treasury bill rate) for Ghana 
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for the period 1994-2004. Acheampong (2005) indicates variations in prime rate affects the lending 
interest rate but not the deposit interest rate. The paper examined the prime-rate-money-market-
interest rate channel in Ghana using time-series estimation methods and data spanning September 
1994 to February 2014. It was concluded that money market rate (lending and deposit) respond 
sluggishly to the prime rate in Ghana. On the other hand, Akosah (2015) found the prime rate to 
be effective in signalling money market rates in long and short term rates but this effect was 
considered incomplete (i.e., not one-to-one). In a cross sectional study of 18 universal banks, it 
was found that the effect of the prime rate on the lending rate of banks in Ghana though negative 
was insignificant (Amidu, 2006). This indicates that universal banks did not respond to monetary 
policy decisions as expected. Kovanen (2011) analysed interest rate pass-through using time series 
and panel bank-specific data of 20 largest banks in Ghana during the period 2005 to 2010. The 
focused variables were the interbank market interest rate and the 91-day Treasury bill interest rate 
which are expected to be relevant bench mark for pricing of retail lending and deposit rates. The 
findings suggest, the interbank interest rate respond to changes in the BoG’s prime rate with one 
month lag in all the models estimated. Long run deviation in the interbank interest rate from the 
prime rate nonetheless suggests the prime rate may not always have provided an accurate reference 
point for the interbank rate due to uncertainty. CEPA (2012) further shows that the prime rate 
largely influences the short term interest rates (91-day Treasury bill rate and the interbank rate) 
relative to long term rates. Notwithstanding, these studies there is clear evidence of significant 
reduction of inflation rate and volatility with fairly rapid adjustment to long run equilibrium in the 
IT policy regime (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2012; Bawumia and Abradu-Otoo, 2003). However, the 
effectiveness of the IT policy on interest rates transmission remain crucial for monetary policy to 
address in Ghana. 
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Regarding the empirical literature elsewhere, there have also been diverse views concerning 
monetary policy transmission under IT regime reported by several studies. Examples of such 
studies include Charoenseang and Manakit (2007) who investigated monetary policy transmission 
in an inflation targeting era in Thailand from June 2000 to July 2006. By employing Engle-Granger 
co-integration and the error-correction model, they analysed the relationship between the prime 
rate and the financial market interest rates. There was only a small pass-through effect of the prime 
rate to financial market interest rates. On the average, the commercial banks’ lending rates tend to 
adjust lower than the deposit rates consistent with the findings by Chong et al. (2006) who stressed 
that lending and deposit rates, are more rigid and take much time in responding to monetary policy 
surprises, a situation which has been attributed to information asymmetry in the banking system. 
With asymmetric adjustment analysis, the commercial bank’s lending rates took more time to 
adjust to the prime rate compared with those of deposit rates. 
 
Froyen and Berument (2009) studied interest rates transmission under IT regime in New Zealand 
by Vector Autoregressive (VAR) estimates using monthly data. They looked directly at the impact 
of innovations in the prime rate on long-term interest rates in a pre and post IT regime. During the 
period of IT (i.e. 1992-2008) both short-term and long-term interest rates in New Zealand were 
lower and less volatile than in the pre-IT period. The response declined even more when only the 
post-1994 period was considered. Thus, greater anchoring of inflationary expectations is a possible 
reason for this decline. However, Roley and Sellon (1995) suggested that many empirical studies 
found only a weak relationship of the impact of policy actions on interest rates. 
 
Hemachandra (2011) examined the relationship between the prime rate and other macroeconomic 
variables in Sri Lanka using the OLS estimation method.  The study found out that 1 percent 
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increase in the prime rate increased the Treasury bill rate by 1.20 percent. The current and previous 
prime rates were also found to influence current deposit rate of the commercial banks. Specifically, 
a 1 percentage increase in previous prime rate increased the current weighted average deposit rate 
by 0.69 percent significantly. Thus not only current prime rate but historical prime rates will have 
effect on deposit rates. Misati et al. (2011) studied the size and speed of interest rate in Kenya and 
found incomplete pass-through in both the short-and long-run. 
 
3.3 Asymmetric adjustment process: A survey 
Asymmetric adjustment process appears to be rather common and has been reported by Kleinmeier 
and Sander (2006) for the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) region and Kwapil and 
Scharler (2010) for the U.S. and the Euro zone. A wide range of literature on the asymmetric 
adjustment of interest rate cover advanced economies. Most of these studies found the interest 
transmission process to be sluggish and asymmetric in advanced economies with little evidence 
for developing countries (Malile, 2013).  
Several indicators in the financial system contribute to the asymmetry of interest rate pass-through. 
Roelands (2012) and Jamilov and Egert (2013) attributed it to factors such as the level of liquidity 
in the banking sector, capital and liquidity requirements of banks, maturity mismatch of the 
assessment of credit risk by banks, maturity mismatch of loan and deposit portfolio, level of 
economic growth, level of competition in the banking sector, type of bank customers, credibility 
of monetary policy, among others.  
The study by Roelands (2012) confirms that capital constraints make banks charge higher lending 
interest rate with slow pass-through of the Federal Fund rate using interest rate data in the US 
economy. Jamilov and Egert (2013) investigated the asymmetric adjustment of interest rate for 
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Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhastan, and Russia using monthly interest rate data in an 
ARDL model. The study found some asymmetric effect for only Georgia and Kazakhastan though 
not statistically significant. In another study, Sznajderska (2012) investigated asymmetric 
adjustment of deposits and lending rates in Polish commercial banks to changes in interbank rates 
during the period 2004-2011. The findings suggest that banks are faster in adjusting their rates for 
credits when the error correction term is below their threshold values in Poland. 
Other studies have identified menu costs (Hofmann and Mizen, 2004) and collusive hypotheses 
(Hannan and Berger, 1991) to be the primary factors of the rigidities in interest rates adjustment. 
Interest rate pass-through may be incomplete due to the cost associated with continuous 
adjustment. Such costs may be menu costs, information costs, and non-pecuniary costs associated 
with adjustments (Hofmann and Mizen, 2004). Menu cost involves the cost of changing pricelist 
and expenditure on adverts to notify customers about products, a situation which is costly and time 
consuming for banks and financial institutions (Madsen and Yang, 1998). In the face of these costs, 
pass-through can only be complete when changes in prime rates are significant and permanent 
(Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994; Dutta et al., 1999). In addition, anticipated changes must be 
successive and in the same direction. Hence, the market will hardly respond to minor changes in 
prime rates. The reason is that, menu costs create flat profit functions with limited incentive to 
vary rates when the changes in prime rates are small (Hofmann and Mizen, 2004).  
 
Lowe and Rohling (1992) provide a further explanation to interest rate rigidities as switching cost. 
The study found that mortgage interest rates in Australia were sticky downwards due to switching 
cost. They explained switching costs such as loan establishment fees, stamp duty, early repayment 
fees associated with moving from one housing loan to another. This is likely to deter borrowers 
from switching to another financial institution to access loan.  
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Hannan and Berger (1991) discusses the collusive behaviour of banks in the financial market. They 
explained that if the banking sector is either concentrated or less competitive, it is more likely for 
banks to use their market power to maximize profits. Such collusion is however likely to break 
down with changes in prices. Break down in collusion is associated with greater costs when deposit 
rates increase compared to when they decrease. However, the opposite cost effect holds for lending 
rates. Moreover, lags between changes in interest rates and the reactions of customers to such 
changes bid up costs associated with deposit rates. Hannan and Berger (1991) therefore explains 
lending rates as being rigid downwards whereas deposit rates are rigid upwards.  
 
Scholnick (1996) provides evidence of asymmetric response between lending and deposit rates in 
the banking industry in Malaysia and Singapore caused by collusive behaviour. Lim (2001) reports 
that collusive bahaviour among banks leads to sticky lending and deposit rates in the short-run. 
Deposit rates have been found to be rigid upwards in many studies in asymmetric adjustment 
models given that banks in concentrated markets are less likely to change deposit rates (Carlton, 
1986; Hannan and Berger, 1991). The size, number of banks, the degree of competition and 
structure of the banking system influence the stickiness of financial market interest rates (Cottarelli 
and Kourelis, 1994, Biekpe, 2011). Other factors such as constraints associated with the movement 
of capital and entry barriers account for the sluggish adjustments in rates (see Cottareli and 
Kourelis, 1994). 
 
 
4 Empirical methodology 
4.1 Empirical model 
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To examine the long-run relationship and ascertain the degree of transmission of the prime rate to 
market interest rates in Ghana, the paper follows the modelling technique of Cook and Hahn (1988) 
and Charoenseang and Manakit (2007) and specifies the following equation.  
 
0 1t t tI a a PR                                                                                                                             (1) 
 
where tI  represents the interest rates (i.e. lending rate, deposit rate or Treasury bill rate) 
endogenously determined in the financial market, tPR  represents the prime rate, t  is the 
stochastic error term with zero mean and constant variance. 0a  measures the constant mark up. 
The long-run parameter 1a  indicates the rate of transmission of the prime rate to the respective 
interest rates. The rate of transmission is expected to be between zero and one. The long-run 
adjustment is complete when 1a  is equal to one and is incomplete when it is less than one. 
However, over pass-through will make the value to be greater than one. A complete pass-through 
means that changes in the prime rate is transmitted in equal proportion to the respective interest 
rate. Theoretically, this paper expects the prime rate to be positively related to the interest rates. 
Inflation does not enter the model if economic agents’ expectation of inflation coincides with that 
of the monetary authorities captured by changes in the prime rate. Ceteris paribus, economic agents 
pay little attention to inflation when they believe monetary authorities will commit to the set 
inflation target and price stability. 
 
The short-run adjustment of the interest rates to changes in the prime rate is examined through the 
error-correction procedure if the variables in equation (1) are co-integrated. In this case, the paper 
estimates the Error-Correction Model (ECM) of the following form; 
 
∆𝐼𝑡 = 𝛽0+∑ 𝛽1𝑗∆ 𝑃𝑅𝑡−𝑗
𝑃
𝑗=1 +∑ 𝛽2𝑗 
𝑃
𝑗=1 Δ𝐼𝑡−𝑗+ 𝛽3 𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1+𝜇𝑡                                                               (2) 
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where 0  and 1  are short-run intercept and prime rate coefficients respectively. The prime rate 
coefficient 1  is interpreted as a short-run transmission parameter. ∆ is the first difference operator, 
t  denotes the error term, 1tECT   
is the lagged error correction term computed from the long-run 
cointegrated relationship of equation (1) with the formula 1 1 1 1t t o tECT I PR      . 3  which 
represents the error correction adjustment speed when the interest rates are away from their 
equilibrium levels is expected to be negative and statistically significant. Under the assumption of 
cointegration the mean adjustment lag (MAL) of a complete transmission is calculated by
1 3(1 ) /  .  
 
The adjustment speed of the interest rates may differ when they are below or above the long-run 
equilibrium (Chong et al., 2006). This result is crucial as the financial market is often slow in 
responding to monetary policy surprises due to the presence of information asymmetry (moral 
hazard and adverse selection) which makes commercial banks charge high interest rate rather than 
reducing loans supply as explained by De Bondt (2005). Within this context, commercial banks 
will only reduce their base rate if they expect continuous decline in the prime rate. On the other 
hand, the fear that borrowers will default leads to higher constant mark-up raising the lending rates. 
Further explanation to information asymmetry is that commercial bank interest rates are 
administratively determined which respond slowly to small changes in the prime rate (Dutta et al., 
1999). The banks will respond only when they expect the monetary policy authorities to commit 
to either reducing or increasing its rate significantly. Also, investors in financial markets are often 
less likely to switch to different financial products due to limited information on interest rates, 
particularly under imperfect competition (Hannan and Berger, 1991). Lastly, due to high switching 
costs, economic agents may not shift to other products/institutions (Heffernan, 1997) when prices 
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change leading to price rigidity in the financial market. All these factors may explain the stickiness 
in the interest rates in adjusting fully to changes in the prime rate.  
 
In testing for information asymmetry in the financial market interest rates when they are above or 
below their equilibrium levels, the dummy variable ( d ) is used in the asymmetric adjustment as 
specified by Chong et al. (2006) and shown in equation (3). 
 
0 1 2 1 3 1(1 )t t t t tI PR dECT d ECT e                                                                                                                  (3) 
 
where 1d   if the residual 1tECT   is positive and 0 if it is negative. To test the difference in 
adjustment speed, the standard Wald test is employed. The difference in the adjustment speed is 
attributed to information asymmetry in the financial market. Faster adjustment is anticipated when 
the expected difference between the current prime rate and the future prime rate is large, while a 
slower adjustment is expected if the reverse holds true. 
 
4.2 Data 
Monthly data covering the period January 2002 to March 2016 is used. The data for the prime rate 
(PR) and the interest rates - the 91-day Treasury bill rate (TBILL91), 182-day Treasury bill 
(TBILL182), commercial banks’ lending rate (LR), and commercial banks deposit rate (DR) are 
obtained from the database of the BoG. The Treasury bill rates are the interest rates offered in the 
open market in order to attract funds from the general public. It is the major source of government 
borrowing to finance maturing debt and budget deficits. Lending rates are charged by commercial 
banks on loans advanced to the private investors and consumers. In this paper the lending rate is 
proxied by the commercial banks’ lending rate which forms the basis for determining all other 
sectors interest rates. Deposit rate is the interest rate paid to savers by commercial banks. 
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Commercial banks pay different rates on deposits depending on how long savers are willing to 
keep their funds under different conditions. The current paper makes use of the 3-month deposit 
interest rate as proxy for deposit interest rate. 
 
4.3 Estimation strategy 
In order to avoid the generation of spurious results normally associated with time series data, the 
variables require testing for the existence of unit root. This paper makes use of the parametric 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test by Dickey and Fuller (1979; 1981), the non-
parametric Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root test by Phillips and Perron (1988) and the Zivot-Andrews 
(Zandrews) test by Zivot and Andrews (1992) which controls for one structural break. The 
relevance of the unit root testing is to determine the order of integration of the variables. In each 
test, the null hypothesis of unit root (non-stationarity) is tested against the alternative hypothesis 
of the absence of unit root (stationarity). Tables A.1.1 - A.1.3 (see the Appendix) report the results 
of the unit root tests according to ADF, PP and Zandrews unit root tests respectively. According 
to the ADF and PP results, all the variables considered are integrated of order one or (1)I  at 1% 
level of significance. These outcomes are further confirmed by the Zandrews test as the null 
hypothesis of unit root without a structural break is not rejected at the 5% level of significance for 
all variables. That is, regardless of the unit root testing procedure used, all the variables can be 
treated as integrated of order one or (1)I .   
The prime rate is assumed to move closely with the financial market interest rates. Therefore, the 
paper examined the presence of cointegration relationships among the variables using the Trace 
test within the framework of the Johansen (1991) cointegration test procedures and the Johansen 
et al. (2000) cointegration procedures which controls for structural break(s) in the series. The 
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Johansen cointegration Trace test results without and with structural break(s) are reported in 
columns 1 and 2 of Tables A.2.1 – A.2.4 respectively (see the Appendix). The results clearly show 
there is evidence of cointegration in all the estimated models (except that for TBILL182) at least 
at the 5% level of significance levels. Since no cointegration relationship is found between 
TBILL182 and the prime rate, in what follows we do not consider results related to this 
relationship. In the case of the other variables (LR, DR and TB92), the evidence of cointegration 
validate the use of the ECM in equation (2) for the analysis as a further examination of the 
coefficient of the error-correction term (β3) (see Table 2). As evident these coefficients are all 
negative and highly significant indicating valid long-run relationship among the variables.  
 
5 Empirical results and discussion 
This section of the paper reports and discusses the estimated long-run transmission of the prime 
rate, short-run dynamic adjustment process and the asymmetric short-run adjustment results. The 
long-run results presented in Table 14 were obtained by estimating equation (1) using the Fully 
Modified Ordinary Least Square (FMOLS) and the Dynamic Ordinary Least Square (DOLS). As 
often argued, these estimates are more robust in the presence of serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity usually associated with time series data (Phillip, 1995).  
 
All the interest rates are positively related to the prime rate and highly significant according to the 
FMOLS and DOLS estimates. The long run estimates show the responsiveness of the market 
interest rates to the monetary surprises (indicated by changes in the prime rate) of the central bank. 
The short term money market interest rate depicts an over pass-through as indicated by the 
                                                          
4 In this Table we also report the Hansen parameter instability cointegration test (Hansen 1992) associated with the 
FMOLS and DOLS. Hansen test has the null hypothesis that the series are cointegrated. As evident the p-values which 
are >0.2 are all not significant. This provides additional support for the cointegration results reported earlier.  
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coefficients of the TBILL91 (1.1541 and 1.2002 for FMOLS and DOLS estimates respectively). 
Thus, the 91-day Treasury bill rate responds more than proportionately to changes in the prime 
rate. The high responsiveness of the Treasury bill rate proves its competiveness as against the other 
market interest rates which further reflect the effectiveness of the central bank in the management 
of credit to control inflation in the open market. Moreover, regular interventions by the monetary 
authorities to raise Treasury bill rate to finance maturing debt can also result in the over-pass-
through. Although, there is incomplete pass-through in both the lending (0.6531 and 0.6579 for 
FMOLS and DOLS estimates respectively) and deposit rates (0.3201 and 0.3197 for FMOLS and 
DOLS estimates respectively) of the commercial banks, the lending rate is more responsive to the 
prime rate. The lending rate happens to be more competitive in the long-run relative to the deposit 
rate. This finding suggests a form of collusive behaviour among the banks as deposit rate appear 
to be more rigid upward than lending rate (see, for instance, Hannan and Berger, 1991). The result 
is not consistent with the findings of Amidu (2006) who found a negative but insignificant 
relationship between the prime rate and the lending rate. It is worth noting that, as expected, 
FMOLS and DOLS results are similar even though the magnitude of the coefficients differ.      
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
The short-run estimates (see Table 2) show that the short term money market interest rate (91-day 
Treasury bill rate) is highly significant at 1% level. This confirms that the money market rate is 
highly responsive to changes in the prime rate both in the short-and long-run, possibly making the 
short term rate an effective instrument to managing domestic credit (demand) and hence inflation. 
As shown in Table 2, it takes about 2-3 months (i.e. about 2.875) for the 91-day Treasury bill 
(TBILL91) to respond completely to the prime rate, making them relatively more competitive in 
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the financial market as shown by their Mean Adjustment Lag (MAL). The result is consistent with 
the findings of Acheampong (2005) for Ghana and Mahasi and Pokhriyal (2013) for Kenya. The 
lending and deposit rates of commercial banks are the most sluggish in adjusting to long-run 
equilibrium taking approximately 13 months (12.99 and 13.115) respectively as shown by their 
MAL. It can be explained that only when the commercial banks expect permanent and significant 
changes in the prime rate will they have the incentive to adjust the lending and deposit interest 
rates according to the menu cost hypothesis (Cotarrellia and Kourelis, 1994). Commercial banks 
have also explained that high default risks and non-performing loans contribute to the 
unwillingness to reduce lending rates significantly when the prime rate falls consistently (De 
Bondt, 2005). In the short run, all the variables show incomplete pass-through. The short-run 
results for the 91-day Treasury bill rate shows it is more competitive than the others since its 
coefficient is the highest (0.7700).  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
The standard Wald test is used to test the speed of adjustment when the rate of transmission is 
above or below equilibrium in the presence of information asymmetry. The null hypothesis π2 = π3 
states no difference in the adjustment speed, while the alternative hypothesis of π2 ≠ π3 means 
otherwise when the prime rate transmission is either above or below equilibrium (Chong et al., 
2006). The results (see Table 3) shows the 91-day Treasury bill (TBILL91) rate adjust faster from 
above equilibrium (4.5 months) than when it is below equilibrium (5.4 months). The fact that the 
TBILL91 adjusts faster to equilibrium depicts high degree of its responsiveness to the prime rate 
in the financial market. From Table 3, the adjustment speed differs in the DR as its probability 
value is greater than 5% by the Wald test implying little significance of information asymmetry in 
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the adjustment process. Stated differently, the Wald test is not significant in the DR showing that 
information asymmetry plays little role in its adjustment process. The adjustment speed is also 
longer here (27.6 months from above equilibrium and 45.9 months from below equilibrium). 
However, the test shows the significance of information asymmetry in the commercial bank 
lending rates. The LR responds faster when it is above equilibrium (i.e. 20.3 months) than when it 
is below equilibrium (i.e. 31.5 months) even though both rates of adjustment are sluggish. Kovanen 
(2011) explained these variations as follows; during periods when the prime rate has been falling, 
the convergence of market interest rate towards the long-term equilibrium appears to be faster and 
statistically significant. On the other hand, during periods of rising prime rates, the convergence is 
not statistically significant.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
6 Concluding remarks and policy recommendations 
This paper has investigated the rate of transmission of the prime rate to financial market interest 
rates in Ghana for the period January 2002 to March 2016. The Johansen and Hansen parameter 
instability cointegration, the FMOLS and the DOLS estimation procedures were used. The long 
run results reveal that the prime rate is crucial in determining interest rates in Ghana. The prime 
rate was found to be significant in determining the lending, deposit and the 91-day Treasury bill 
rate in the financial market especially in the long-run. The rate of transmission, however, differs 
depending on the type of interest rate under consideration. The 91-day Treasury bill rate shows 
over-pass-through making it the most responsive in the market, signalling its effectiveness in 
managing liquidity and stabilizing the economy. There is incomplete pass-through in the 
commercial banks’ deposit rate whiles the lending rate is almost complete. In the short-run, the 
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effect of the prime rate on the deposit rate was not significant while that on the lending rate was 
weakly significant. The commercial banks deposit rate proved to be the most sticky and 
uncompetitive in the financial market.  
 
Based on these findings, the study recommends effective communication of the IT policy by the 
Bank of Ghana. The periodic monetary committee decisions on the prime rate should be effectively 
communicated to the general public through press releases and publications in the dailies, as well 
as other forms of the media. Economic agents will factor these policies in their decisions if they 
are fully aware and understand the policies better. Simultaneously, the Bank of Ghana should be 
committed to steering the economy along the inflation path that it sets for the economy. This will 
make the policy more credible and instil the confidence of the public in anchoring expectations. 
To ensure competition among commercial banks in the country, regular publishing of lending and 
deposit rates is needed to allow the public make informed decision on borrowing and saving. This 
should be done regularly as the prime rate is reviewed to make customers switch or bargain for 
interest rates. To further address the asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, the Credit 
Reference Bureau system should be strengthened to collect accurate data on borrower’s 
characteristics to reduce default rate in the economy. It is important that commercial banks also 
consider factors such as default rate, profitability, operating expenses and several others in addition 
to the prime rate in determining their lending and deposit rates. The present paper could not 
consider all these variables. Notwithstanding, this does not affect the main results reported in this 
paper given that all the estimated models are cointegrated.  
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FIGURE 
 
Figure 1: Trends in the 91 and the 182 Treasury bill rates, the prime rate, the deposit interest 
rate, and the lending interest rate 
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TABLES 
 
       Table 1 Long run transmission of the prime rate to the respective interest rates 
 
FMOLS 
 
DOLS 
 
 
Dependent 
Variables 
 
   (α1) 
 
Standard 
Error    
 
Hansen 
(Lc) 
 
    (α1) 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
Hansen  
(Lc) 
 
TBILL91 
 
1.1541*** 
 
0.3970 
    
0.2606 1.2002*** 0.1531 0.0048 
 
DR 
 
0.3201*** 
 
0.0735 
    
0.3417 0.3197*** 0.0420 0.0051 
 
LR 
 
0.6531*** 
 
0.1729 
 
0.1505 
 
0.6579*** 
 
0.0840 
 
0.0026 
        Note: *** indicates significant at the 1% level. PR is the independent variable. Hansen (Lc) is  
        the Hansen parameter instability cointegration test statistic. All Hansen (Lc) test statistic have  
        p-values > 0.2. 
 
Table 2 Short-run error-correction results 
Variables          β1            β3   MAL 
∆TBILL91 0.7700(0.00) -0.0800 (0.0033)             2.875 
∆DR 0.0390(0.5852) -0.0740(0.0044) 12.99 
∆LR            0.2367 (0.0762) -0.0582 (0.0373) 13.115 
Note: β1 is the short run transmission parameter of the prime rate and β3 is the co-efficient of the error 
correction term. The values in parenthesis are the probabilities. ∆PR is the independent variable 
 
Table 3 Asymmetric short run adjustment results 
 
Variables 
 
π1 
 
      π2 
 
       π3 
 
MAL+ 
 
MAL- 
 
Wald Test 
 
∆TBILL91 
 
0.6275(0.00) 
 
0.0821(0.02) 
 
0.0690(0.15) 
 
4.54 
 
5.40 
 
7.6706(0.00) 
 
∆DR 
 
0.1099(0.13) 
 
0.0323(0.38) 
 
0.0194(0.57) 
 
27.56 
 
45.88 
 
0.8295(0.48) 
∆LR        0.3739(0.01)      0.0308(0.42)     0.0199(0.58) 20.33 31.46 3.8683(0.02) 
Note: MAL+ = (1- π1)/ π2 is the mean adjustment lag when the degree of transmission is above equilibrium 
whiles MAL- = (1- π1)/ π3 represents otherwise. The values in parenthesis are the probabilities. 
 
Table
2 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
PRE-TEST TABLES 
 
Table A.1.1 ADF Unit Root Test Results 
Variables Levels First Difference 
No Trend Trend No Trend Trend 
TBILL91 -2.700414 -2.695253 -10.15046*** -10.13675*** 
TBILL182 -2.272432 -2.242162 -7.207494*** -7.201105*** 
DR -2.712473 -2.528994 -13.50832*** -13.56125*** 
LR -2.732258 -2.172058 -14.08135*** -14.29297*** 
PR -1.104911 -0.339573 -5.372512*** -13.57032*** 
Source: Authors. 
Note: *** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at the 1 per cent level      
 
 
Table A.1.2 PP Unit Root Test Results 
Variables Levels First Difference 
No Trend Trend No Trend Trend 
TBILL91 -2.279772 -2.259256 -14.48213*** -10.48790*** 
TBILL182 -2.427037 -2.341777 -14.48213*** -14.46807*** 
DR -2.712473 -2.515755 -13.52190*** -13.57372*** 
LR -2.731272 -2.164477 -14.04332*** -14.25354*** 
PR -1.578466 -0.645391 -13.25681*** -13.78342*** 
Source: Authors. 
Note: *** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at the 1 per cent level. 
 
Table A.1.3 Zandrews Unit Root Test Results 
Variables Intercept Trend Intercept + Trend 
TBILL91 -3.354 -3.940 -3.926 
TBILL182 -2.807 -3.158 -3.292 
DR -3.408 -2.696 -3.682 
LR -2.705 -2.619 -2.856 
PR -1.641 -1.956 -2.001 
Source: Authors. 
Note: The 5 per cent critical values for the intercept, trend and intercept + trend models are -4.80, 
-4.42 and -5.08 respectively. 
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Table A.2.1 Johansen cointegration test for TBILL91 
Trace Test without Structural Break Trace Test with Structural Break 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Trace 
Statistic 
Prob. 95% Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Trace 
Statistic 
Prob. 95% 
None* 15.28941 0.0537 15.49471 None* 43.00 0.0096 36.79 
At most 1 1.075528 0.2997 3.841466 At most 1 6.43 0.8552 18.51 
Trace statistic indicates cointegration at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
*** MacKinnon-Haug Michelis (1999) p-values 
 
 
Table A.2.2 Johansen cointegration test for TBILL182 
Trace Test without Structural Break Trace Test with Structural Break 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Trace 
Statistic 
Prob. 95% Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Trace 
Statistic 
Prob. 95% 
None 12.47528 0.1355 15.49471 None 34.11 0.0934 36.79 
At most 1 0.689058 0.4065 3.841466 At most 1 5.30 0.9277 18.51 
Trace statistic indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
*** MacKinnon-Haug Michelis (1999) p-values 
 
 
Table A.2.3 Johansen cointegration test for DR 
Trace Test without Structural Break Trace Test with Structural Break 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Trace 
Statistic 
Prob. 95% Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Trace 
Statistic 
Prob. 95% 
None* 31.28796 0.0001 15.49471 None* 37.91 0.0352 36.50 
At most 1 1.233810 0.2667 3.841466 At most 1 6.16 0.8611 18.34 
Trace statistic indicates cointegration at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
*** MacKinnon-Haug Michelis (1999) p-values 
 
 
Table A.2.4 Johansen cointegration test for LR 
Trace Test without Structural Break Trace Test with Structural Break 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Trace 
Statistic 
Prob. 95% Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Trace 
Statistic 
Prob. 95% 
None* 27.44036 0.0005 15.49471 None* 52.88 0.0005 37.01 
At most 1 0.788252 0.3746 3.841466 At most 1 15.74 0.1264 18.68 
Trace statistic indicates cointegration at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
*** MacKinnon-Haug Michelis (1999) p-values 
 
 
